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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Hubbard pied guilty to failure to register. However, at sentencing, the 
district court made several comments evidencing its intent to impose a harsher 
sentence premised on the underlying lewd and lascivious charges because it felt 
California had been too lenient when it sentenced Mr. Hubbard in that regard. The 
Idaho district court did not trust California to keep Mr. Hubbard in prison (which the 
Idaho district court believed necessary, but which the California superior court, in its 
discretion, had suspended), and so the Idaho district court decided to go above and 
beyond the recommendation of the State and impose a significant prison sentence in 
the California superior court's stead. In doing so, the Idaho district court committed a 
fundamental error, violating Mr. Hubbard's state and federal constitutional protections 
against double jeopardy. As such, his sentence should be vacated and a more lenient 
sentence imposed. 
Additionally, the district court abused its discretion by failing to redline 
Mr. Hubbard's Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) to strike statements 
which tended to indicate that he had two lewd and lascivious charges in his criminal 
record. The record demonstrates that such statements are erroneous and unreliable 
because Mr. Hubbard only had one such charge in his record. As such, this Court 
should remand this case so that the PSI may be properly redlined and the record made 
clear. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hubbard entered a guilty plea to the charge of failure to register. (Tr., p.17, 
Ls.9-13.) In doing so, he freely admitted that the reason he did not register was that he 
1 
was absconding from supervision in California. (Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) California 
secured a governor's warrant to extradite Mr. Hubbard back to its jurisdiction. (See Tr., 
p.26, Ls.1-5.) Pursuant to Mr. Hubbard's plea agreement with Idaho, the prosecutor 
recommended that for failing to register, the district court should impose a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15.) Defense counsel, 
recognizing that California was going to pursue the parole violation (as it had secured 
the governor's warrant), recommended a unified sentence of five years, with only one 
year fixed, for the failure to register charge and argued that Idaho should let California 
bear the cost of Mr. Hubbard's continued incarceration. (Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.5.) 
The district court, however, chose to focus on the facts relating to the offense 
which led to Mr. Hubbard's qualification under the registration law, rather than the facts 
relating to the offense for which he was appearing in its courtroom. (See Tr., p.29, 
L.16 - p.33, L.55.) The Idaho district court criticized Mr. Hubbard's explanation of those 
underlying yet unrelated offenses: 
I sort of heard a theme there that, you know, it's the meth, it's the 
marijuana ... no one in my drug court while under the influence of any of 
those drugs goes out and molests young girls. Your drugs have nothing to 
do with it. That was a decision you made .... You blame the victim in this 
case. 
(Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3; p.33, Ls.18-19.) It expressed its distrust of the competency 
of the California superior court to "properly" address his sentence on those charges: 
I suspect that the [Idaho] taxpayer would just as soon as pay the cost to 
make sure that you're locked up and not trust California to do what it's 
supposed to do. You have four L&L's [sic], you pied to two, and they put 
you on five years probation .... [You c]ontinually violated your parole. 
They let you out. You violate. Put you back in. You violate. So I don't 
feel comfortable trusting California to not allow you out again. 
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(Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; p.32, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).) It discussed its 
perspectives in regard to the investigation surrounding a second potential victim: "And 
there was a second person who came and made allegations, whether [Mr. Hubbard] 
was actually convicted or not. And I've also found that people can pass polygraphs all 
over the place .... [T]hey are not accurate."1 (Tr., p.33, Ls.20-25.) Based on these 
considerations, rather than on the facts surrounding Mr. Hubbard's failure to register, 
the district court decided that it would not follow the plea agreement and imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. As part of its sentence, it also 
imposed the maximum permissible fine of $5,000 and an additional $975.50 in costs, 
including $375 for the Victim's Compensation fund, $350 for the public defender, and 
up to $100 for the presentence investigation. (Tr., p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.1; R., pp.38-40.) 
Based on I. C. § 18-8311, the sentence was executed and made consecutive to his 
sentence from California. (Tr., p.33, Ls. 7-11.) 
Mr. Hubbard filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35), and he was given leave to file new information. (R., p.37.) 
However, no new evidence was filed and the district court denied the motion. 
(R., pp.45-49.) In addition to reiterating its extensive consideration of the underlying 
1 Defense counsel had already clarified that there was no conviction in regard to the 
second alleged victim and Mr. Hubbard had passed a polygraph examination in regard 
to those allegations. (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-22.) In fact, Mr. Hubbard had objected to the 
presentation of that information in his PSI. (PSI, p.228; Tr., p.20, Ls.17-21 (defense 
counsel stating that he submitted objections to the PSI in writing and the district court 
indicating that those objections had been made part of the record.) The PSI presented 
the information in such a way as to make it appear as though Mr. Hubbard had more 
felony convictions for lewd and lascivious conduct than he actually did. (PSI, pp.4, 14.) 
The district court made no indication on the PSI document itself indicating that the 
information regarding those particular incidents was unreliable or open to severe 
misinterpretation. (See PSI, pp.4, 14.) 
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lewd and lascivious charges, the district court added, "The Court also weighed the 
necessity to protect society from future similar crimes [lewd and lascivious acts]. The 
Court found that in order to deter future such crimes by [Mr.] Hubbard, this sentence 
was necessary. There is a need to deter [Mr.] Hubbard from such behavior." (R., p.47.) 
With that attempt to justify its excessive sentence, the district court denied the Rule 35 
motion. (R., pp.47-48.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Hubbard's right to be free from double 
jeopardy when it imposed a sentence in this case premised on the belief that 
California had been too lenient in its initial sentencing on the underlying offenses. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by focusing intently and almost 
exclusively on Mr. Hubbard's other offenses for which he had already been 
punished instead of the facts of the charge at issue when it imposed a sentence 
in the case before it. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to redline the unreliable 




The District Court Violated Mr. Hubbard's Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy 
When It Imposed A Sentence In This Case Premised On The Belief That California Had 
Been Too Lenient In Its Initial Sentencing On The Underlying Offenses 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hubbard had been sentenced for several lewd and lascivious conduct 
charges by a California superior court. However, when he failed to register in Idaho, the 
Idaho district court criticized the California court's sentencing approach. As it discussed 
that issue and those underlying charges (which were not pending before it, nor even 
within its jurisdiction), the Idaho district court essentially resentenced Mr. Hubbard on 
those underlying charges, rather than on the charge currently pending before it. Based 
on its perception that the California superior court could not be trusted to "properly" 
incarcerate Mr. Hubbard, the Idaho district court imposed a harsher sentence in 
this case. In doing so, the district court violated Mr. Hubbard's state and federal 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 
B. The District Court's Violation Of The Protection Against Double Jeopardy 
Constitutes Fundamental Error And May Be Raised For The First Time On 
Appeal2 
When the district court violated the state and federal constitutional provisions 
against double jeopardy, it committed a fundamental error. And while the appellate 
2 The Court of Appeals did consider this question in regard to a very similar abuse 
perpetrated by this same district court some six years ago. See State v. Lee, 2005 
Unpublished Opinion No. 534 (Ct. App. 2005). It declined to provide relief for that 
abuse. However, as an unpublished opinion, the Lee opinion is not controlling 
precedent. See id. Furthermore, its analysis predates the Idaho Supreme Court's 
landmark decision in State v. Perry, which redefined the necessary analysis in regard to 
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court will generally not address issues not presented below, if the error is fundamental, 
it may be argued for the first time on appeal and the appellate court will rule on the 
merits of the argument. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224-25 (2008). 
Fundamental error is analyzed by a three-prong test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in 
most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (internal citations omitted). In this case, all three prongs are 
present, and therefore, this Court should remedy the district court's fundamental error. 
1. The District Court's Actions, Which Were Tantamount To Resentencing 
Mr. Hubbard For The Underlying Crime Instead Of The Current Charge, 
Violated His Unwaived Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy 
The United States Constitution provides that "No person shall be ... subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
The federal protection against double jeopardy has been incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 
(1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1989). 
The Idaho Constitution provides the same protection as the federal constitution. IDAHO 
CONST. Art. I, § 13. Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with its 
federal counterpart. State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001). 
These protections can be violated in three ways: (1) engaging in a second 
prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been entered; (2) engaging in a 
the fundamental error doctrine. See Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2008). Therefore, this issue 
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second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction has been entered; and 
(3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117,129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. The district court's violation in 
this case is an example of the third form of violation. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized that, even if the punishments imposed are authorized by the Legislature, 
imposing them in a second proceeding violates the double jeopardy protections. State 
v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 778 (1999).3 There is also nothing in the record indicating 
that Mr. Hubbard waived his state and federal constitutional protections in this regard. 
Mr. Hubbard had been sentenced for the underlying charges by the appropriate 
court in California, where all the relevant acts took place. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.131-32 
(the Judgment of Conviction entered by the California superior court).) In its discretion, 
the California superior court suspended the imposition of an underlying sentence and, 
instead, imposed a five-year term of probation.4 (PSI, p.131; see also pp.133-37 (the 
needs to be reconsidered in light of the new controlling precedent that is on point. 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court cited to United States v. Halper to support this conclusion. 
490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper held that the State may not seek a civil penalty that is for 
retributive, as opposed to remedial, purposes in a proceeding separate from the 
proceeding in which the criminal penalty was imposed because doing so constitutes a 
second punishment and so violates the protections against double jeopardy. Halper, 
490 U.S. at 448-49. Halper, however, has been subsequently abrogated because it 
deviated from traditional double jeopardy analyses. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, 99, 101 (1997). It failed to make the threshold determination of whether the civil 
penalties were so punitive as to transform them into criminal penalties, thus bringing 
them within the realm of the double jeopardy protections, and to assess the statute 
under which the sanctions were imposed, as opposed to the character of the sanctions 
themselves. Id. The Hudson abrogation, however, only attacks the Halper Court's 
consideration of the penalties themselves, not the conclusion that imposing them at a 
second proceeding would violate the double jeopardy protections. See id. As such, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion in Avelar survives Hudson, so long as the additional 
penalties are appropriately within the scope of the double jeopardy protections. 
Imposing more extensive prison sentences are definitely within the scope of those 
protections. 
4 The California superior court had the discretion to delay imposing or executing a 
sentence for a period of probation not exceeding the maximum time permitted for a 
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order suspending the sentence and setting forth the terms of probation).) That court 
also found Mr. Hubbard to be in violation of his probation in 2005, at which point, in its 
discretion, it revoked Mr. Hubbard's probation and executed a six-year sentence. (PSI, 
p.156.) Neither of those decisions appears to be beyond its statutory authority to make. 
See Cal. Penal Code§§ 288(a), 1203.1 (a).5 
Nevertheless, the Idaho district court, displeased with the California superior 
court's exercise of its discretion, determined that "I don't feel comfortable trusting 
California to not allow you out again." (Tr., p.32, Ls.4-6.) The Idaho district court 
continued: 
I'm not going to go through all of the--everything that's in this presentence 
report. But it is really clear that the prosecutor has nailed it. 6 You blame 
the victim in this case, and according to her statements, that abuse started 
when she was six years old. And there was a second person who came 
and made a/legations, whether he was convicted or not. And I've also 
found that people can pass polygraphs all over the place. 7 
(Tr., p.33, Ls.15-24 (emphasis added to provide one of many examples of the district 
court's focus on the underlying crime, rather than the charge pending before it).) The 
sentence under the law. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (a). California requires a three, six, 
or eight year prison term for such convictions. See Cal. Penal Code § 288(a). 
Therefore, the five year period of probation was within the California superior court's 
discretion to impose in that case. See Cal. Penal Code§ 1203.1 (a). 
5 He was subsequently released on parole. (See, e.g., PSI, p.143.) 
6 The prosecutor comments in this regard consist of quoting from a letter Mr. Hubbard 
wrote to the victim's mother in which he discussed his views of the underlying offense at 
that time. (See Tr., p.22, L.17 - p.24, L.13.) The letter is included in the PSI 
immediately following the police reports and immediately preceding the judgment of 
conviction in the underlying case, indicating that it was written at the time the underlying 
case was proceeding (which was some ten years ago). (See PSI, pp.124-32.) 
7 This statement indicates that the district court felt that Mr. Hubbard had hoodwinked its 
counterpart from California, earning a more lenient sentence because he had been 
deliberately deceptive on a polygraph. (See Tr., p.33, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Hubbard had 
taken and passed that polygraph in regard to accusations from a second potential victim 
(i.e., answered truthfully, denying those allegations). (See Tr., p.31, Ls.13-22.) 
According to Mr. Hubbard, there was not a second conviction at that time, but there was 
a revocation of his probation. (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-22.) 
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Idaho district court's statements reveal that it felt that its counterpart from California had 
somehow abused its discretion (although there has been no showing that it had done 
so) and been too lenient in its dealings with Mr. Hubbard. (See, e.g., Tr., p.30, L.22 -
p.32, L.6.) It proceeded to impose the sentence it did to punish Mr. Hubbard for those 
underlying offenses. (See, e.g., Tr., p.33, Ls.9-25.) 
As such, the Idaho district court imposed an impermissible second punishment 
for the same offense. See, e.g., Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778. This violated Mr. Hubbard's 
unwaived state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
2. The Error Is Clear And Obvious Based On The Appellate Record 
Mr. Hubbard was charged with failing to register as a sex offender. (R., p.18.) 
The applicable statutes only require the State to prove that Mr. Hubbard was subject to 
the code sections and that he failed to provide certain information to the State within 
the requisite time frame. See I.C. § 18-8307. It does not require an investigation or 
disclosure of the underlying offense. See id. The inquiry is separate and distinct from 
the underlying prosecution. 8 See id.; I.C. § 18-8311. The punishment for failing to 
register is separate from that of the underlying prosecution. See I.C. § 18-8311 
(particularly noting the fact that if the defendant was on probation (i.e., already 
separately punished)9 when he failed to register, the district court's discretion to order 
probation or retain jurisdiction is removed). 
8 This is particularly true in this case, since the Idaho district court would have no 
jurisdiction over the acts committed in Trinity County, California. 
9 Mr. Hubbard recognizes that the statute does not clarify whether the probation is for 
the underlying offense or some other offense, but would assert that, as this section is 
predicated on a prior offense, the period of probation may be reasonably construed to 
include probation for the underlying offense. See I.C. § 18-8311. As such, the statute 
itself does recognize that this is a separate and distinct punishment from that for the 
underlying crime. See id. 
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Therefore, when the Idaho district court focused on the facts of the underlying 
offense and based the sentence on those facts (rather than those relating to 
Mr. Hubbard's failure to register), it went well beyond the scope of the governing 
statutes. 10 The error is clear from the statements the district court made at sentencing. 
(See Tr., p.29, L.16 - p.34, L.9.) 
For example, the district court berated Mr. Hubbard, saying: 
I sort of heard a theme there that, you know, it's the meth, it's the 
marijuana ... no one in my drug court while under the influence of any of 
those drugs goes out and molests young girls. Your drugs have nothing to 
do with it. That was a decision you made .... You blame the victim in this 
case. 
(Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3; p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) Most interestingly, the 
district court refers to "the victim in this case." (Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19.) "This case" is a 
failure to register case. (R., pp.4-5.) The only victim in a failure to register case is the 
state; there is no specific victim. (See, e.g., PSI, p.2.) There is certainly not a victim 
who Mr. Hubbard can blame. In fact, he did not blame Idaho for his failure to register: 
"I was absconding, so I wasn't even looking up the laws or anything. I was trying to get 
[a friend] up here to the VA hospital and get gone, get back to California. So I didn't 
even bother looking it up. [I] was being a big dummy." (Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) He 
accepted responsibility for his actions and did not blame the State of Idaho for his 
failure. (See Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) 
Therefore, the only victim to whom the Idaho district court could possibly be 
referring is the victim in the underlying lewd and lascivious case. The fact that it refers 
10 In trying to justify this position, the district court wrote in the denial of the Rule 35 
motion that the sentence was necessary to deter "future similar crimes." (R., p.47.) It 
had discussed the lewd and lascivious convictions immediately before making that 
statement, which would make lewd and lascivious acts the "future similar crimes" to be 
deterred, as opposed to failure to register. (R., p.47.) 
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to her as the victim "in this case" is critical and clearly demonstrates the error. 
(Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) "This case" is not the lewd and lascivious case, 
yet the district court behaved as if it were. Therefore, the sentence it imposed was 
premised on the lewd and lascivious case, not the failure to register charge, and thus, 
clearly violated Mr. Hubbard's state and federal constitutional protections against double 
jeopardy. 
And while consideration of the defendant's criminal record may be permissible at 
sentencing, the district court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the judgment 
of another court. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(recognizing that the sentencing court has broad discretion, which will not be interfered 
with absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion). 11 It is impermissible to 
remedy any dissatisfaction with the severity of a sentence imposed by another court 
by punishing the defendant again for those same offenses. State v. Findeisen, 133 
Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999). Because, based on its comments, that is exactly what 
the district court did to Mr. Hubbard, its error is clear from the record. (See, e.g., Tr., 
p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; p.32, Ls.2-6.) 
11 Even though this sentence was imposed by a California court, it must be treated to 
have the same effect as a sentence imposed by an Idaho court, as a failure to do so 
would violate the full faith and credit provisions of the federal Constitution. See, e.g., 
State v. Howard, 150 Idaho 471, 4 77-78 (2011 ). Therefore, as the California superior 
court's actions were within its discretion, it is not the place of the Idaho district court to 
substitute its judgment and impose a different sentence in place of its counterpart's 
permissible judgment. See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229-230 (Ct. App. 
1999); Flores v. Lodge, 101 Idaho 533, 534 (1980) (holding that, in a habeas 
proceeding, it would be improper for the judgment of a Fourth District Court to be 
substituted for the proper judgment imposed by a Third District Court). 
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3. The Error Affected The Outcome Of The Trial Proceedings By Resulting In A 
Harsher Sentence 
The Idaho district court's decision that the California superior court could not be 
trusted to do its job led directly to the Idaho district court's decision to impose a 
sentence that went beyond even the recommendation of the prosecutor, the 
community's representative in these proceedings. (See Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.32, L.1.) The 
prosecutor was able to consider Mr. Hubbard's past record, including those underlying 
lewd and lascivious charges, while keeping that consideration as a part of the 
discussion regarding the failure to register allegation. (See Tr., p.22, L.2 - p.25, L.2.) 
Based on its consideration of the appropriate factors, the prosecutor recommended a 
unified sentence of ten years, with only three years fixed, for Mr. Hubbard's failure to 
register. 12 (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-6.) 
Contrarily, the district court improperly focused on the facts of the underlying 
offense, and based on that improper focus, imposed a unified sentence of ten years 
with five years fixed. (Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.1.) In addition, it also imposed the 
maximum permissible fine of $5,000 and an additional $975.50 in costs, including $375 
for the Victim's Compensation fund, $350 for the public defender, and up to $100 for the 
presentence investigation. (Tr., p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.1; R., pp.38-40.) This demonstrates 
that the district court's error, its violation of Mr. Hubbard's protection against double 
jeopardy by imposing a second sentence for his underlying conduct, affected the 
outcome of his case. 
Therefore, as all three Perry prongs are present, this violation constitutes a 
fundamental error, which this Court should remedy. 
12 The fact that he was willing to agree to this recommendation evidences his belief that 
this sentence would serve all the sentencing objectives. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Focusing Intently And Almost 
Exclusively On Mr. Hubbard's Other Offenses For Which He Had Already Been 
Punished Instead Of The Facts Of The Charge At Issue When It Imposed A Sentence In 
The Case Before It 
A. Introduction 
Even if this Court finds that the district court did not violate Mr. Hubbard's 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy, it should nevertheless conclude that 
the district court's intense and almost exclusive consideration of the facts surrounding 
Mr. Hubbard's past offenses, rather than the facts surrounding his current offense, 
represents an abuse of discretion. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
B. The District Court's Improper Focus On The Facts Of An Already-Adjudicated 
Case, Rather Than The Facts Of The Case Pending Before It Caused It To 
Impose An Excessive Sentence In An Abuse Of Its Discretion 
While the district court does have wide discretion to consider various information 
at sentencing, including the defendant's criminal history, it does not have the discretion 
to "essentially impose[] sentence for offenses other than the one that was before the 
court." Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229. This is particularly true if the defendant is already 
subject to a criminal sentence for those other offenses. Id. at 230. The evidence of 
such an abuse of discretion may be found by looking at the comments of the court 
and/or prosecutor to see whether they are intensely and almost exclusively focused on 
the other offenses, rather than the pending charge. See id. at 229-30. The fact that 
they are dissatisfied with the severity of the sentence imposed by the other court does 
not, however, authorize the district court to impose a harsher sentence for those acts. 
Id. at 230. 
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The district court in this case did exactly what the Court of Appeals found 
inappropriate in Findeisen. It stated unequivocally: 
I suspect that the [Idaho] taxpayer would just as soon as pay the cost to 
make sure that you're locked up and not trust California to do what it's 
supposed to do. You have four L&L's [sic], you pied to two, and they put 
you on five years probation .... [You c]ontinually violated your parole. 
They let you out. You violate. Put you back in. You violate. So I don't 
feel comfortable trusting California to not allow you out again. 
(Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; p.32, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).) The district court in this 
case was dissatisfied with the lenient sentence the California superior court imposed for 
the lewd and lascivious offenses in its discretion. And so it usurped that court's 
responsibility and imposed a harsher sentence, despite the current sentence that 
Mr. Hubbard was already serving for those offenses. 13 
For that, and all the other reasons set forth in Section I, it is clear that the district 
court, at the very least, abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Hubbard's sentence 
while focused intently and almost exclusively on the facts of his other offenses, rather 
than the facts of the case pending before it. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Redline The Unreliable And 
Erroneous Statements Regarding Mr. Hubbard's Criminal History From The PSI 
The district court abused its discretion by failing to red line certain parts of the PSI 
which, based on the evidence presented, were erroneously included in that report. (See 
PSI, pp.4, 14.) The two sections of the PSI relating to Mr. Hubbard's prior criminal 
record are written so as to suggest that he had two separate convictions for lewd and 
lascivious conduct. (See PSI, pp.4-14.) Mr. Hubbard objected to the inclusion of such 
15 
statements because they are erroneous in light of a complete understanding of the 
sentence initially imposed by the California superior court in 2002. (PSI, p.228; Tr., 
p.20, Ls.18-21 (indicating that defense counsel submitted the objections in writing and 
the district court appended them to the PSI).) The imposition of his initial sentence was 
suspended for a period of probation (not unlike the withheld judgment process in Idaho). 
(PSI, p.131; see also pp.133-37 (the order suspending the sentence and setting forth 
the terms of probation).) In 2005, the California superior court revoked that probation 
and, for the first time in that case, articulated and imposed a term sentence. (See PSI, 
p.156.) As evidenced by the record, Mr. Hubbard only had one lewd and lascivious 
charge in his record, and thus, the statements to the contrary are clearly unreliable, and 
thus, should be stricken from the PSI. See, e.g., State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961-62 
(Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
The reason this is necessary is that the information in this PSI may continue to 
be used at future proceedings (i.e., parole hearings), and so the district court needs to 
ensure a clear and accurate record is persevered, particularly when information in the 
PSI is unreliable. See id. In this case, the references to a "conviction for lewd conduct" 
in 2005 are empirically proven to be unreliable and inaccurate, but remain unaltered on 
the face of the document, which would tend to indicate that those comments are 
reliable. Therefore, those comments needed to be stricken from the record. The failure 
to do so constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. See, e.g., State v. Mauro, 
121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991); but see State v. Carey, 274 P.3d 21, 23-24 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that, where the defendant's challenges to the PSI do not undermine the 
13 Mr. Hubbard was on parole (see, e.g., PSI, p.143), continuing to serve time against 
his six-year sentence which was imposed by the California superior court when he 
violated the terms of his initial probationary term. (PSI, p.156.) 
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reliability or accuracy of the information included in the PSI, redlining is unnecessary). 
Since Mr. Hubbard demonstrated that the district court has, in fact, abused its 
discretion, this case should be remanded so that the PSI may be properly redlined and 
the record made clear. See e.g. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hubbard respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he respectfully requests 
that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
He also respectfully requests that, on remand, the district court be instructed to 
properly strike the unreliable information in his PSI and make the record clear in that 
regard. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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